Radical Noesis - Thinking outside the box

The summation of the recommendations reads as follows:

Getting Khartoum to agree means upping the international pressure with four measures:

* applying targeted sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, to key NCP leaders who have already been identified by UN-sponsored investigations as responsible for atrocities in Darfur, and encouraging divestment campaigns;
* authorising through the Security Council a forensic accounting firm or a panel of experts to investigate the offshore accounts of the NCP and NCP-affiliated businesses so as to pave the way for economic sanctions against the regime's commercial entities;
* exploring sanctions on aspects of Sudan's petroleum sector, to include at least bars on investment and provision of technical equipment and expertise ; and
* planning to enforce a no-fly zone over Darfur by French and U.S. assets in the region, with NATO support; obtaining Chad's consent to a rapid-reaction force on its Sudan border; and, if everything else fails to change government policies and the situation worsens, contingency planning for non-consensual deployment of 40,000 to 50,000 peace enforcers to Darfur.
Getting the UN Into Darfur

The NCP (National Congress Party) is totally in control of the oil contracts in Sudan. Those contracts are worth in excess of $1 billion a year, and 50% of that is from the Southern Sudan - where much of the "displacement" of people is occurring:

The state-owned China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) is a 40 per cent stakeholder in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), the main oil-producing consortium in Sudan, along with Malaysia's Petronas (30 per cent), India's ONGC-Videsh (25 per cent), and state-run Sudapet (5 per cent). GNPOC operates oil Blocks 1, 2 and 4, which produce the majority of Sudan's roughly 500,000 bpd. These blocks overlap the border of northern and southern Sudan and fall substantially into the Abyei territory, as defined by the Abyei Boundaries Commission. The demarcation of the North-South border, as envisaged by the CPA, has not yet taken place, primarily due to NCP intransigence. The CNPC has a 95 per cent share of Block 6, in Southern Kordofan and South Darfur. Blocks 3 and 7, which recently came online with the completion of a new oil pipeline, are 41 per cent owned by CNPC and, 6 per cent owned by the Chinese petroleum company Sinopec. China imports the majority of Sudan's oil. (footnote page 8)

In 1997 Clinton signed Executive Order 13067, which placed economic sanctions on Sudanese government and businesses, but excluded the "lucrative ... granted to gum Arabic imports."

One of the problems of intervening in Darfur is that those interventions would risk political conflict with China. The ICG notes that such intervention might also be interpreted as an act of war - against China. Currently, U.S. pension funds have "$91.2 billion invested in holdings with ties to Sudan." These pension funds include state, city, and educational institutions, as well as TIAA-CREF. ICG recommends divestiture of investments such as these, and actions by other nations.

The report strongly demonstrates that without loosening the economic control of the NCP, that the crisis in Darfur is likely to continue indefinitely. That so many beyond the NCP are benefiting directly and indirectly from the conflict is no surprise. It is the steamy world of desirable resources and greed over morality. The International Crisis Group rightly (in my opinion) targets these vested interests to remove the incentive for genocide.

Related
The report "Getting the UN into Darfur" (also available as a MS Word document) has a wealth of information on the role of the oil industry and oil nations in the Sudan.

International Crisis Group. 7/25/05. The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan's Uncertain Peace

International Crisis Group. 3/31/06. Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead